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Abstract 
 
The concept of „open innovation‟ has received a considerable amount of coverage within the 
academic literature and beyond. Much of this seems to have been without much critical analysis of 
the evidence. In this chapter we show how Chesbrough creates a false dichotomy by arguing that 
open innovation is the only alternative to a closed innovation model. We systematically examine the 
six principles of the open innovation concept and show how the Open Innovation paradigm has 
created a partial perception by describing something which is undoubtedly true in itself (the 
limitations of closed innovation principles), but false in conveying the wrong impression that firms 
today follow these principles. We hope that our examination and scrutiny of the „open innovation‟ 
concept contributes to the debate on innovation management and helps enrich our understanding. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the four years since the publication of our original paper (Trott & Hartmann, 2009), we have 
received numerous email correspondence from scholars of innovation management thanking us for 
our critique. In this chapter we have added a discussion at the end about the increasing number of 
alleged industrial espionage cases in the business press. It may be that together with an open 
innovation strategy a firm needs also to adopt a tight IP protection strategy. We also discuss and 
acknowledge a few of the significant papers that have made useful contributions to this stream of 
research.  
 
While Chesbrough (2003; 2006) partly acknowledges the rich source of antecedents to the „open 
innovation paradigm‟ there may be many scholars of R&D management and innovation 
management who would argue that this paradigm represents little more than the repackaging and 
representation of concepts and findings presented over the past forty years within the literature on 
innovation management. In short, it is old wine in new bottles. Since we published our original 
paper (Trott & Hartmann, 2009) open innovation has continued to remain a popular subject of 
interest to both practitioners and academics alike. The intention of our paper was to try to raise a 
few issues of critique to a concept that we felt had emerged onto the innovation studies field with 
very little academic criticism. Since then there have been hundreds of papers on open innovation 
but only a few that have provided a critique (Dahlander & Gann 2010; Enkel & Lenz, 2009; 
Huizingh, 2011). 
 
Within the field of R&D Management it is the pioneering work of Alan Pearson and Derek Ball 
more than thirty years ago that has done so much to develop thinking in this area (cf. Pearson et al., 
1979; Griffiths & Pearson, 1973). With regards to innovation management, the network model of 
innovation, advocated by Rothwell & Zegveld (1985) more than twenty years ago, emphasised the 
need for external linkages within the innovation process. Moreover, as far back as 1959, Carter & 
Williams uncovered that a key characteristic of technically progressive firms was their high quality 
of incoming information. Indeed, Thomas Allen‟s work on Gatekeepers in the 1960s also showed 
the importance of good external linkages to acquire information and knowledge from outside the 
organisation (Allen, 1969). SPRU‟s Project SAPPHO (1974) also confirmed the need for high 
quality external linkages in successful innovation. Clearly, there is plenty of evidence from many 
years ago stressing the need for firms to work beyond their own boundaries. In addition, previous 
research has shown that industrial companies that conduct their own R&D are better able to access 
externally available information (e.g. Tilton, 1971; Allen, 1977, Mowery, 1983; Cohen & Levinthal, 
1989). So, R&D departments have long recognised the importance of information and knowledge 
beyond their own organisations. Moreover, substantial efforts have been undertaken to improve the 
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ability of firms to acquire external knowledge. For example, firms have spent large sums of money 
addressing issues such as the not invented here syndrome (NIH), scanning and networking, and 
absorptive capacity. Furthermore, sixteen years ago, Rothwell (1992) presented the case for a 5
th
 
generation model of R&D management, where he emphasised the need for increased external focus 
utilising information technologies. Obviously, the need for firms to adopt a more outward-looking 
focus to their R&D, technology management and NPD has been repeatedly stressed by many 
authors. Significantly, Tidd (1993) explained how an open and connected model of innovation 
facilitates the development of products and services that cross traditional technological and market 
boundaries in the home automotion industry. Furthermore, there has been research that examines 
specific issues with respect to increasing collaborations amongst firms. For example, Hoecht & 
Trott (1999) discussed the problems of information leakage with respect to open and closed sytems 
of technology acquisition. It is hardly surprising then that some within the field raised their 
eyebrows at the suggestion that innovation needs to adopt a new paradigm, one that is „open‟ rather 
than closed. 
To help set the scene for what seems to have been a widespread uncritical adoption of the open 
innovation concept, Table 1 summarises the wide publicity that it has received within the innovation 
management literature. This table also presents a thematic analysis of papers and books that cite the 
term „open innovation‟.  
 
Table 1: A summary of the widespread adoption of the ‘open innovation’ notion (grouped into the 
themes found in the existing literature) 
 
 
Themes  References 
The Notion of Open 
Innovation 
Chesbrough (2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004, 2006); Chiaromonte (2006); 
Gassmann & Reepmeyer (2005); Gaule (2006); Gruber & Henkel (2006); 
Motzek (2007); West & Gallagher (2006); West, Vanhaverbeke, & 
Chesbrough (2006) 
Business models Chesbrough (2003c, 2007); Chesbrough & Schwartz (2007); Van der Meer 
(2007) 
Organizational design and 
boundaries of the firm 
Brown & Hagel (2006); Chesbrough (2003b); Dahlander & Wallin (2006); 
Dittrich & Duysters (2007); Fetterhoff & Voelkel (2006); Jacobides & 
Billinger (2006); Lichtentaler & Ernst (2006); Lichtenthaler (2007a, 
2007b); Simard & West (2006), Tao & Magnotta (2006) 
Leadership and culture Dodgson, Gann & Salter (2006); Fleming & Waguespack (2007); 
Witzeman et al. (2006) 
Tools and technologies Dodgson, Gann & Salter (2006); Enkel, Kausch & Gassmann (2005); 
Gassmann, Sandmeier & Wecht (2006); Henkel (2006); Huston & Sakkab 
(2006, 2007); Piller & Walcher (2006); Tao & Magnotta (2006) 
IP, patenting and appropriation Chesbrough (2003a); Henkel (2006); Hurmelinna, Kyläheiko & Jauhiainen 
(2005) 
Industrial dynamics and 
manufacturing 
Bromley (2004); Christensen, Olesen & Kjaer (2005); Cooke (2005); 
Vanhaverbeke (2006) 
Source: Fredberg et al. (2008). 
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Chesbrough (2003) presents six notions that lie behind the so called closed model of innovation (see 
Table 2). The problem here is that he uses a straw man argument, which misrepresents the true 
position of innovation management today. Creating this fallacy about „closed innovation‟ systems 
makes it is easy to refute and demolish it (as he does), which is what should happen if it were at all 
true. However, it is not, and certainly not within enlightened firms. Indeed, it is so misleading and 
inaccurate as to be offensive to the progressive firms who have studied R&D management and 
invested large sums of money in their own R&D processes. Given this historical backdrop, the next 
section examines the so called principles of the so called closed model of innovation against the 
established innovation management literature. 
 
 
Table 2: Contrasting ‘closed innovation’ principles and ‘open innovation’ principles 
 Closed innovation principles Open innovation principles 
i The smart people in our field work for us.  Not all of the smart people work for us so we must 
find and tap into the knowledge and expertise of bright 
individuals outside our company. 
ii To profit from R&D, we must discover, 
develop, produce and ship it ourselves. 
External R&D can create significant value; internal 
R&D is needed to claim some portion of that value. 
iii If we discover it ourselves, we will get it to 
market first.  
We don‟t have to originate the research in order to 
profit from it. 
iv If we are the first to commercialize an 
innovation, we will win.  
Building a better business model is better than getting 
to market first. 
v If we create the most and best ideas in the 
industry, we will win.  
If we make the best use of internal and external ideas, 
we will win. 
vi We should control our intellectual property 
(IP) so that our competitors do not profit from 
our ideas. 
We should profit from others‟ use of our IP, and we 
should buy others‟ IP whenever it advances our own 
business model. 
Source: Chesbrough (2003). 
 
 
2. An examination of the evidence of the closed innovation principles 
 
i. The smart people in our field work for us.  
The notion that the „old‟ closed model of innovation is based on the premise that firms believed 
they employed all the smart people is misguided. As far back as 1919, UK chemical industry was 
very aware that German chemical firms were extremely well advanced in industrial R&D, as the 
following excerpt from a contemporary document shows: 
 
One of the most striking features in the works visited is the application in the broadest sense of 
science to chemical industry. This is naturally very prominent in the triumvirate of the Bayer, 
Farbwerke Hoechst and the BASF, but it is equally noticeable in many of the smaller 
undertakings. The lavish and apparently unstinted monetary outlay on laboratories, libraries 
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and technical staff implies implicit confidence on the part of the leaders of the industry in the 
ability to repay with interest heavy initial expenditure. 
(Source: ABCM (1919) Report of the British Chemical Mission on Chemical 
Factories in the Occupied Area of Germany.) 
 
It was Thomas Allen of MIT who in the early 1960s identified that there was much technology and 
expertise beyond the boundary of the firm (Allen, 1969). His work identified and popularized the 
role of the gatekeeper: someone who was able to help link scientists within the firm to groups of 
scientists outside the firm so they may exchange knowledge and information which improves the 
performance of R&D research groups. Michael Tushman added to this body of work by exploring 
the wider notion of boundary spanners: those individuals (not just within an R&D setting) who 
collect and exchange knowledge and information on behalf of the firm (Tushman, 1977). These 
significant bodies of work are conveniently overlooked in order to strengthen the first principle of 
the closed innovation model.  
 
The innovation literature for many years has emphasized interaction. Indeed, innovation has been 
described as an information–creation process that arises out of social interaction. In effect, the firm 
provides a structure within which the creative process is located (Nonaka & Kenney, 1991). It is 
these interactions that provide the opportunity for thoughts, potential ideas and views to be shared 
and exchanged. This view is supported by a study of Japanese firms (Nonaka, 1991) where the 
creation of new knowledge within an organization depends on tapping the tacit and often highly 
subjective insights, intuitions and hunches of individual employees and making those insights 
available for testing and use by the organization as a whole. This implies that certain knowledge and 
skills, embodied in the term „know-how‟, are not easily understood; moreover they are less able to 
be communicated. This would suggest that to gain access to such knowledge one may have to be 
practicing in this or related areas of knowledge. Cohen & Levinthal (1990: 130) refer to this 
condition as „lockout‟, suggesting that failure to invest in research and technology will limit the 
ability of an organization to capture technological opportunities: „once off the technological 
escalator it is difficult to get back on‟. 
 
So, the available literature informs us that R&D managers have recognized for over 100 years that 
not all knowledge and expertise resides within their firm. Moreover, for the past fifty years R&D 
Managers have been exploring how best to exploit knowledge beyond the firm. 
 
ii. To profit from R&D, we must discover, develop and ship it ourselves. 
Technology partnerships between and in some cases among organizations have been rising rapidly 
since the 1970s. From 1976 to 1987, the annual number of new joint ventures rose six fold; by 
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1987, three-quarters of these were in high-technology industries (Faulkner, 1995; Kaufman et al., 
2000; Lewis, 1990). As the costs, including risk associated with R&D efforts, continued to increase, 
no company could remain a „technology island‟ and stay competitive. Vyas et al., 1995 suggested 
that we were witnessing the fall of the „go-it-alone‟ strategy and the rise of the octopus strategy. 
This was recognition that businesses were slowly beginning to broaden their view of their business 
environment from the traditional „go-it-alone‟ perspective of individual firms competing against 
each other. The formation of strategic alliances meant that strategic power now resides in sets of 
firms acting together. The development of cell phones, treatments for viruses such as AIDS, aircraft 
manufacture and motor cars are all dominated by global competitive battles between groups of 
firms. The success of the European Airbus strategic alliance is a case in point. Formed in 1969 as a 
joint venture between the German firm MBB and the French firm Aerospatiale, it was later joined 
by CASA of Spain and British Aerospace of the United Kingdom. The Airbus A300 range of 
civilian aircraft achieved great success in the 1990s securing large orders for aircraft ahead of its 
major rival Boeing. 
 
Further evidence that co-operation and alliances between firms is nothing new can be illustrated by 
the wide types of alliances that exist. Moreover, they can involve a customer, a supplier or even a 
competitor (Chan & Heide, 1993). The literature has identified at least eight generic types of 
strategic alliance (Bleeke & Ernst, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Faulkner, 1995; Conway & Stewart, 1998): 
licensing, supplier relations, outsourcing, joint venture, collaboration (non-joint ventures), R&D 
consortia, industry clusters, innovation networks. 
 
In addition, the notion within the „closed innovation‟ model that firms have been undertaking all the 
activities including discovering, manufacturing and distributing themselves is misleading as Table 3 
clearly illustrates. 
Table 3: Compilation of reasons for entering a strategic alliance 
Reasons Examples 
Improved access to capital and 
new business 
European Airbus to enable companies to compete with Boeing and 
MacDonnell Douglas 
Greater technical critical mass Alliance between Phillips and LG, Korea. Provides access to Phillips‟ 
technology and lower manufacturing costs in Korea. 
Shared risk and liability Sony-Ericsson, a joint venture between two electronics firms to try to 
dominate cell phone handset market 
Better relationships with strategic 
partners 
European Airbus 
Technology transfer benefits Customer supplier alliances, e.g. VW and Bosch 
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Reduce R&D costs GEC and Siemens 60/40 share of telecommunications joint venture: GPT 
Use of distribution skills Pixar and Disney 
Access to marketing strengths NMB, Japan and Intel; NMB has access to Intel‟s marketing 
Access to technology Ericsson gained access to Sony‟s multi-media technology for third-
generation cell phones 
Standardisation Attempt by Sony to get Betamax technology as industry standard 
By-product utilisation GlaxoSmithKline and Matsushita, Canon, Fuji 
Management skills J Sainsbury and Bank of Scotland; Sainsbury accessed financial skills 
Sources: Littler (1993), Chan & Heide (1993), Harney (2001), Budden (2003). 
 
Finally, the open innovation concept seems to overlook all the research on technology transfer and 
absorptive capacity, which emphasized the need to focus efforts not just on accessing technology, 
but also on recognizing that in order to profit from technology developed outside the organization a 
firm must undertake R&D to absorb the benefits (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Trott & Cordey-Hayes, 
1993). 
 
One of the more challenging issues for R&D Managers is when to outsource R&D activities; with 
the inherent risks associated with this activity of giving away critical core competences to others. 
 
 
iii. If we discover it ourselves, we will get it to market first.  
The industrial R&D landscape is full of evidence to the contrary of this third principle of the closed 
innovation model. For example, Corning is unique among major corporations in deriving the 
majority of its turnover from joint ventures and alliances. The company has a long and impressive 
heritage: as a specialist glass manufacturer it had its own R&D laboratory as far back as 1908. In 
the 1930s it began combining its R&D with other firms in other industries, giving it access to a wide 
variety of growth markets. An alliance with PPG gave it access to the flat glass building market; an 
alliance with Owens provided access to the glass fibres market and an alliance with Dow Chemicals 
provided it with an opportunity to enter the silicon products market. Corning now has a network of 
strategic alliances based on a range of different technologies. These technology alliances deliver 
revenue in excess of its own turnover. Similarly, Xerox‟ Palo Alto laboratories in Silicon Valley 
were responsible for a number of breakthrough technologies including the graphical-user-interface 
technology that later became incorporated into the mouse we use today. Yet, clearly Xerox was 
unable to profit from this technology. 
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R&D activities have changed dramatically since 1950. The past 20 years have witnessed enormous 
changes in the way companies manage their technological resources and in particular their research 
and development. There are numerous factors that have contributed to these changes. Rothwell & 
Zegveld (1985) identify three important factors: 
 Technology explosion. An estimated 90 per cent of our present technical knowledge has been 
generated during the last 55 years. 
 Shortening of the technology cycle. The technology cycle includes scientific and technological 
developments prior to the traditional product life cycle. These cycles have been slowly 
shortening, forcing companies to focus their efforts on product development. For example, the 
market life of high volume production cars has decreased from approximately 10 years in the 
1960s to approximately six years in the 1990s. In some cases a particular model may be 
restyled after only three years. 
 Globalisation of technology. Countries on the Pacific Rim have demonstrated an ability to 
acquire and assimilate technology into new products. This has resulted in a substantial increase 
in technology transfer in the form of licensing and strategic alliances. 
 
The effect of these macro-factors was a shift in emphasis within industrial R&D from an internal to 
an external focus. In a study of firms in Sweden, Japan and the United States Granstrand et al. 
(1992) revealed that the external acquisition of technology was the most prominent technology 
management issue in multi-technology corporations. Traditionally, R&D management, particularly 
in Western technology-based companies, has been management of internal R&D. It could be argued 
that one of the most noticeable features of Japanese companies since the Second World War has 
been their ability to successfully acquire and utilise technology from other companies around the 
world. Granstrand et al. (1992) suggest that the external acquisition of technology exposes 
technology managers to new responsibilities. Although this implies that acquiring technology from 
outside the organization is something new, this is clearly not the case, as the long history of 
licensing agreements shows. However, the importance now placed on technology acquisition by 
technology-based companies reveals a departure from a focus on internal R&D and an 
acknowledgement that internal R&D is now only one of many technology development options 
available. The technology base of a company is viewed as an asset; it represents the technological 
capability of that company. The different acquisition strategies available involve varying degrees of 
organizational and managerial integration. For example, internal R&D is viewed as the most 
integrated technology-acquisition strategy with technology scanning the least integrated strategy. 
Technology scanning is rather narrowly defined by Granstrand et al. (1992) as both illegal and legal 
forms of acquiring technological know-how from outside. 
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The classification of technology-acquisition strategies offered by Granstrand et al. (1995) provides 
an illustration of the numerous ways of acquiring external technology. Other classifications can be 
found in the technology transfer literature: Auster (1987); Chesnais (1988); Hagedoorn (1990); 
Lefever (1992).  
 
It is necessary to counsel caution here, for there are clear potential financial benefits from being the 
owner of the proprietary technology and having secure intellectual property protection. For 
example, Pilkington developed the float glass manufacturing process and then licensed it to every 
glass manufacturer in the world. 
 
 
iv. If we are the first to commercialize an innovation, we will win.  
Table 4 illustrate the wide range of industries that bear witness to the evidence that being first to 
market does not ensure victory. The innovation policy pursued by a firm cuts a wide path across 
functions such as manufacturing, finance, marketing, R&D and personnel, hence the importance 
attached to its consideration. The four broad innovation strategies commonly found in technology-
intensive firms (Freeman, 1982; Maidique & Patch, 1988) are discussed below. These are not 
mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive. A wide spectrum of other strategies is logically 
possible; indeed, very often a firm adopts a balanced portfolio approach with a range of products. 
Nonetheless the key point here is that firms recognize innovation success involves more than simply 
being first to commercialise a technology. 
Leader/offensive 
The strategy here centres on the advantages to be gained from a monopoly, in this case a monopoly 
of the technology. The aim is to try to ensure that the product is launched into the market before the 
competition. This should enable the company either to adopt a price-skimming policy, or to adopt a 
penetration policy based on gaining a high market share. Such a strategy demands a significant 
R&D activity and is usually accompanied by substantial marketing resources to enable the company 
to promote the new product.  
Fast follower/defensive 
This strategy also requires a substantial technology base in order that the company may develop 
improved versions of the original, improved in terms of lower cost, different design, additional 
features, etc. The company needs to be agile in manufacturing, design and development and 
marketing. This will enable it to respond quickly to those companies that are first into the market. 
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Without any in-house R&D their response would have been much slower, as this would have 
involved substantially more learning and understanding of the technology. 
Cost minimisation/imitative 
This strategy is based on being a low-cost producer and success is dependent on achieving 
economies of scale in manufacture. The company requires exceptional skills and capabilities in 
production and process engineering. This is clearly similar to the defensive strategy, in that it 
involves following another company, except that the technology base is not usually as well 
developed as for the above two strategies. Technology is often licensed from other companies. This 
is a strategy that has been employed very effectively by the rapidly developing Asian economies. 
With lower labour costs these economies have offered companies the opportunity to imitate existing 
products at lower prices, helping them enter and gain a foothold in a market, for example footwear 
or electronics. From this position it is then possible to incorporate design improvements to existing 
products (Hobday et al 2004). 
Market segmentation specialist/traditional 
This strategy is based on meeting the precise requirements of a particular market segment or niche. 
Large-scale manufacture is not usually required and the products tend to be characterised by few 
product changes. They are often referred to as traditional products. Indeed, some companies 
promote their products by stressing the absence of any change, for example Scottish whisky 
manufacturers. 
 
Significantly, there are additional advantages to being first to market, such as building a scientific 
and innovation reputation. Sony, for example, while it has not always maximised revenue from its 
innovations (Betamax technology), it has nonetheless developed an enviable position for its 
technology. 
 
 
Table 4: Throughout the twentieth century ‘Late Entrants’ have been surpassing pioneers 
 
Product Pioneer(s) Imitator/Later  
Entrant(s) 
Comments 
35mm Cameras Leica (1925) 
Contrax (1932) 
Exacta (1936) 
Canon (1934) 
Nikon (1946) 
Nikon SLR (1959) 
The pioneer was the technology and 
market leader for decades until the 
Japanese copied German 
technology, improved upon it, and 
lowered prices. The pioneer then 
failed to react and ended up as an 
incidental player 
CAT Scanners 
(Computer Axial 
Tomography) 
EMI (1972)  Pfizer (1974) 
Technicare (1975) 
GE (1976) 
The pioneer had no experience in 
the medical equipment industry. 
Copycats ignored the patents and 
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Johnson & Johnson (1978) drove the pioneers out of business 
with marketing distribution, and 
financial advantages, as well as 
extensive industry experience 
Ballpoint pens Reynolds (1945) 
Eversharp (1946) 
Parker „Jotter‟ (1954) 
Bic (1960) 
The pioneers disappeared when the 
fad first ended in the late 1940s. 
Parker entered 8 years later. Bic 
entered last and sold pens as cheap 
disposables. 
MRI (Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging) 
Fonar (1978) Johnson & Johnson‟s 
Technicare (1981) 
General Electric (1982) 
The tiny pioneer faced the huge 
medical equipment suppliers, which 
easily expanded into MRIs. The 
pioneer could not hope to match 
their tremendous market power 
Personal Computers MITS Altair 8800 
(1975) 
Apple II (1977) 
Radio Shack (1977) 
IBM-PC (1981) 
Compaq (1982) 
Dell (1984) 
Gateway (1985) 
The pioneers created computers for 
hobbyists, but when the market 
turned to business uses, IBM entered 
and quickly dominated, using its 
reputation and its marketing and 
distribution skills. The cloners then 
copied IBM‟s standard and sold at 
lower prices 
VCRs Ampex (1956) 
CBS-EVR (1970) 
Sony U-matic (1971) 
Catrivision (1972) 
Sony Betamax (1975) 
JVC-VHS (1976) 
RCA Selectra Vision (1977) 
made by Matsushita 
The pioneer focused on selling to 
broadcasters while Sony pursued the 
home market for more than a 
decade. Financial problems killed 
the pioneer. Sony Betamax was the 
first successful home VCR but was 
quickly supplanted by VHS, a late 
follower, which recorded for twice 
as long. 
Word-processing 
software 
Wordstar (1979) WordPerfect (1982) 
Microsoft Word (1983) 
The pioneer was stuck with an 
obsolete standard when it failed to 
update. When it did update, 
Wordstar abandoned loyal users, 
offered no technical support, and 
fought internally. The follower took 
advantage. 
Web browser Mosaic (1993) 
Netscape (1994) 
Internet Explorer; Firefox Leader of the Mosaic team left to 
form a new company netscape. In 
1996 Netscape‟s market share was 
86% but then Microsoft started 
incorporating Internet Explorer with 
its operating system. It now has 75% 
market share. 
Search Engine Altvista (1994) 
Yahoo (1995) 
Google (2000) The pioneer was overhauled by the 
late entrant that developed superior 
algorithm facilitating more accurate 
search. 
Source: Trott (2008). 
 
v. If we create the most and best ideas in the industry, we will win.  
Once again a tired old argument has been put up so that it can be demolished. This principle seems 
to be based on the old idea that more R&D is better, whereas firms such as 3M and Pilkington know 
all too well that increased R&D expenditure without the corresponding link to new products leads to 
serious questions from your shareholders. In particular, investors rightly want to know what is 
happening to all the money that is being poured into research and technology. Hence, it is the ability 
to capture ideas from R&D and convert these into products and services that people want to buy that 
is more significant than idea generation.  
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President Kennedy‟s special address to the US Congress in 1961, in which he spoke of „putting a 
man on the moon before the decade was out‟, captured the popular opinion of that time. Many 
believed anything was possible with sufficient investment in technology development. This notion 
helps to explain one of the major areas of difficulty with R&D. Traditionally, it was viewed as a 
linear process, moving from research to engineering and then manufacture. That R&D was viewed 
as an overhead item was reinforced by Kennedy‟s pledge to spend „whatever it costs‟, and indeed 
enormous financial resources were directed towards the project. Clearly, the Apollo project was a 
political decision – a unique situation without the usual economic or market forces at play. 
Nevertheless, some sectors of industry have adopted a similar approach to that used by the space 
programme. Vast amounts of money were poured into R&D programmes in the belief that the 
interesting technology generated could then be incorporated into products (e.g., The Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI; „Star Wars‟); The International Space Station; Nuclear Fusion research). In 
many instances this is exactly what happened, but there were also many examples of exciting 
technology developed purely because it was interesting, without any consideration of the 
competitive market in which the business operated. Hence, many business leaders began to question 
the value of R&D. 
 
This, of course, was almost fifty years ago and much has changed since. We now know that the 
management of research and development needs to be fully integrated with the strategic 
management process of the business. This will enhance and support the products that marketing and 
sales offer and provide the company with a technical body of knowledge that can be used for future 
development. Too many businesses fail to integrate the management of research and technology 
fully into the overall business strategy process (Adler et al., 1992). A report by the European 
Industrial Management Association (EIRMA, 1985) recognised R&D as having three distinct areas, 
each requiring investment: R&D for existing businesses, R&D for new businesses, and R&D for 
exploratory research. It is these basic principles that drive R&D today not the narrow technology 
focused notion that firms conduct R&D for the sake of more technology. 
 
 
vi. We should control our intellectual property (IP) so that our competitors do not profit from our 
ideas. 
The sixth and final principle of the closed innovation model is simply unreasonable. One only has to 
look at the long history of licensing where firms have been trading intellectual property for decades. 
The exchange of patents between fierce detergent rivals P&G and Unilever in the 1970s and the 
buying and selling of licences between firms in the chemical industry is an accepted way of doing 
business in these industries. 
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Famous licensing cases from Pilkington‟s Float Glass process to JVC‟s VHS cassette technology 
illustrate that when it comes to intellectual property firms know only too well that getting others 
involved is a necessary part of the process to achieve success. JVC won the VCR battle with Sony 
partly because it unlike Sony successfully secured joint venture partnerships and licensed its VHS 
technology to many other manufacturers ensuring that the VCR format was built into more 
machines than Sony‟s Betamax format. Pilkington famously developed the float glass process for 
the manufacture of flat glass. Pilkington quickly recognised that enormous opportunities existed 
through licensing the manufacturing process to other glass manufacturers, that is competitors, rather 
than keeping the technology to itself. 
 
Mutual self-interest is the common dominator behind most licensing contracts, as it is in other 
business contracts. Licences to competitors constitute a high percentage of all licences extended; 
Microsoft‟s disk-operating system (MS-DOS) is a case in point. These normally arise out of a desire 
on the part of the competitor to be free of any patent infringement in its development product 
features or technology. They are also due to the owner of the patent seeking financial gain from the 
technology. Other reasons for licensing include: to avoid or settle patent infringement issues; 
to diversify and grow through the addition of new products; to access technology and improve the 
quality of existing products and or to obtain improved production or processing technology. 
 
It is worthy of note here that following the open innovation prescription of buying and selling IP to 
advance our business model seems reasonable in theory. But, in practice when you are competing 
with other firms, trying to gain access to a technology that is already licensed to a competitor is 
extremely difficult. Indeed, firms frequently specify exclusive licensing arrangements to ensure 
others are unable to access the technology. 
 
 
3. Using a false dichotomy to introduce the concept of Open Innovation 
 
The Open Innovation paradigm is presented by contrasting it with the apparent old paradigm of 
closed innovation. Open vs. closed creates an intuitive dichotomy between the old way of doing 
R&D and the new way which adopts the principles of Open Innovation. It is obvious that this 
dichotomy is exaggerated at best and plain false in general. The convincing example of Xerox, 
which Chesbrough describes at length in the first chapter of his 2003 book, sets the stage for 
condemning the six erroneous notions of closed innovation which almost lead to the demise of this 
industrial giant. Xerox with its Palo Alto Reseach Center (PARC) is widely recognized as a one-of-
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a kind historical conundrum. Most business historians use Xerox as the prime example of a 
company with excellent R&D facilities, yet unable to convert new ideas into commercial products.  
 
In this chapter, we show that the dichotomy between closed innovation and open innovation may be 
true in theory, but does not really exist in industry, certainly not to the extent of the case of Xerox. 
However, we recognize the advantage of using such a false dichotomy to get an important message 
across, even when many of the underlying principles of that message were already implemented 
many years ago by the majority of the companies addressed. It is a helpful and stimulating tactic to 
introduce a „new concept‟ (such as Open Innovation) to companies that are already most of the way 
there. Companies which „discover‟ that they have already implemented most of the principles of the 
new paradigm will be more eager to also consider the remaining changes needed to turn them into a 
genuine Open Innovator than companies that find themselves entirely stuck in the old paradigm. It 
is the psychology of encouraging someone who is (seemingly) already halfway there. 
 
Natural selection (competition in a free market economy) would already have killed off companies 
that remained stuck in the old paradigm of closed innovation. While it is not known how many 
companies could have been labeled „closed innovators‟ (or simply „closed‟) in the past, it is obvious 
that such companies do not appear to exist today, except in very specialize fields with niche 
markets. Some prominent big corporations such as IBM and the aforementioned Xerox have 
unmistakably flirted with disaster by making some of the mistakes that Chesbrough lists as the 
notions of closed innovation (see Section 2). However, they overcame these shortcomings without 
the aid of the Open Innovation paradigm, which means that these ideas did already exist. Indeed, 
these cases are used as the inspiration to lay the foundation for the Open Innovation paradigm.  
 
Table 1 provides evidence of the widespread adoption of the Open Innovation concept. Managers 
and academics are sometimes accused of jumping on bandwagons, for fear of missing the latest 
popular fad. Indeed, there are many examples of such mentality that have swept through otherwise 
sedate, serious organisations. For example, for a while, everyone was excited over something called 
“quality circles” and “Theory Z” forms of Japanese-style management. Then everyone went 
“searching for excellence” before they found “process re-engineering.” More recently “disruptive 
innovation” has been rolling around the globe. Whether these bandwagons are driven by evidence 
based research or are simply fads is usually determined with the passing of time. What we must try 
to avoid is sloppy thinking and the uncritical adoption of concepts. The original insight and context 
that gave rise to the concept can get lost as people scramble to jump on the bandwagon. This leads 
people to focusing on things that are often irrelevant or unrelated to the benefits the insight 
promised to deliver (Alexander & Korine, 2008).  
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4. Issues unresolved by Open innovation 
 
Despite its success – as measured by the amount of attention it has received in the R&D literature 
(see Table 1), the commercial success of Chesbrough‟s books, and the willingness of big companies 
to embrace, implement and preach its principles – Open Innovation is not perfect. The most obvious 
shortcoming is that the model is inherently linear, and basically a variation on the well-known 
stage-gate model (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986) without any feedback or feed-forward 
mechanisms. The only distinguishing difference is that in the Open Innovation model ideas 
(technologies; knowledge) can freely „fly in‟ and „fly out‟ of the funnel that runs from opportunity 
scanning to business incubation. This is visualized by a funnel that contains holes which enable the 
exchange of ideas along the way. However, the flow of the innovation trajectory is linearly forward. 
New innovation models, such as the Cyclic Innovation Model (CIM; Berkhout et al., 2007) 
emphasize the importance of feed forward and feedback mechanisms, as well as the notion that 
innovation is inherently a cyclic process where new innovations build upon previous innovations. 
Moreover, according to CIM innovation can start anywhere within the cycle; there is no fixed point 
of origin like those demarking the beginning of the outdated (but still widely used) „technology-
push‟ and „market-pull‟ models. If anything, modern innovation models should once and for all get 
rid of the notion of linearity in the innovation process. Hence, it will be a significant improvement 
when the cyclic concepts of CIM are combined with and integrated into the Open Innovation model 
to overcome its implicit linearity.  
 
With all the openness that Open Innovation describes comes the potential danger of knowledge 
leakage. The information sharing/knowledge loss dilemma has received substantial attention in the 
innovation and knowledge management literature in recent years. Firms in knowledge-intensive 
industries in particular need to engage in collaborative R&D to sustain their competitive advantage 
and need to „open up‟ to knowledge sharing with their partner organisations if they wish to reap the 
benefits of such collaboration. Inkpen & Dinar (1998), for example, have highlighted the 
importance of alliance partners as a particular important source of new external knowledge and 
Lincoln et al. (1998) have emphasized the need for open communication and rich knowledge 
sharing as a key success factor for knowledge acquisition. While there is little doubt in the literature 
on the merits of open communication for successful learning, there is also an increasing awareness 
that the information sharing required to facilitate such learning can lead to the leakage of 
commercially sensitive knowledge (Hoecht & Trott, 1999; Norman, 2004). Organisations 
participating in R&D alliances in particular face the challenge of attempting to maintain a 
sufficiently „open‟ knowledge exchange regime for meeting their collaborative R& D objectives 
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while sufficiently controlling knowledge flows to minimise unintended leakage of sensitive 
knowledge and technologies (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). The principle ways in which this trade-off 
can be addressed is either by careful design of suitable relationship governance structures and 
relationship management instruments or by attempting to limit the scope of alliance activities in 
terms of the degree of knowledge sharing (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). 
 
Clearly a strategy of open innovation may help to develop technology and business partners, but if a 
firm is openly sharing its knowledge and technology it should not be surprised to find a long queue 
of potential partners at its door. Of greater concern is that there have also been a few papers 
reminding practitioners and academics alike that the so-called closed model of innovation may still 
be most suitable for many firms. Indeed, the business press has been full of stories covering various 
alleged aspects of industrial espionage. Most notable of these are the Dyson case where it alleges 
that a former employee was hired to gather industrial secrets about its electric motors for German 
and Chinese firms. A similar case was revealed by GM when it alleged that a former employee was 
passing trade secrets about its Hybrid Technology to Chinese firms (see Table 5). 
 
Firms needs to be careful that a partner does not simply run off with their technology. It may be that 
together with an open innovation strategy a firm needs also to adopt a tight IP protection strategy. In 
many ways we are suggesting that if you are going to negotiate with partners about technology it is 
far better to negotiate from a position of strength. This can be achieved with effective IP protection. 
Intellectual property (IP) is a company asset and should be treated and managed as such. Owning 
and acquiring IP will not overcome poor business strategy and make a company successful. IP is a 
broad concept and includes many different intangibles such as patents (inventions), copyright 
(works of authorship, software, drawings, etc) know-how (e.g. expertise, skilled craftsmanship, 
training capability, understanding of how something works), trade secrets (a protected formula or 
method), trademarks (logos, distinctive names), industrial design (the unique external appearance) 
and semi-conductor mask works (the physical design of semiconductor circuits). There are many 
examples of firms with exciting technology that failed to profit from it. Classic cases such as the 
EMI scanner (MRI) are taught to business students. This technology was developed by EMI but 
they failed to develop a business model to exploit it.  
 
Table 5: Cases of alleged knowledge theft 
 
Complainant Accused Nature of IP Nature of event 
GM Former 
employee 
Trade secrets A former General Motors engineer with access to 
the automaker's hybrid technology was convicted 
in November 2012 with her husband of stealing 
trade secrets for possible use in China. 
Dyson Bosch Trade secrets A rogue employee in Dyson‟s digital motors 
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facility was handing company secrets to Bosch 
divisions in the UK and in Germany. Dyson has 
now filed proceedings against Bosch in the High 
Court in London.  
Pittsburgh 
Corning Corp 
  Trade secrets In 2012 two Chinese citizens in Kansas City, 
Missouri, were charged with attempting to pay 
$100,000 for stolen trade secrets from Pittsburgh 
Corning Corp, an affiliate of Corning Inc., at its 
Sedalia, Mo. facility. The US Justice Department 
said the pair were trying to purchase the trade 
secrets so a rival plant could be opened in China. 
Dupont Pangang 
Group Steel 
Vanadium 
& Titanium 
Co Ltd 
Trade secrets U.S. chemicals giant Dupont (DD.N) is in the 
midst of a legal battle over allegations that China-
based Pangang Group Steel Vanadium & Titanium 
Co Ltd conspired to steal its trade secrets. 
Massachusetts 
wind-energy 
company 
American 
Superconductor 
Employee IP In 2012, an Austrian-based employee of the 
Massachusetts wind-energy company American 
Superconductor stole intellectual property from the 
firm and sold it to Chinese wind turbine 
manufacturer Sinovel for $1.5 million. 
 
 
If we now look more closely at developments in the literature, we can see useful contributions. The 
notion of appropriation governs a firm‟s ability to capture the profits generated by an innovation 
(Teece, 1986). It was this notion that forms the basis of recent classifications of open innovation 
into inbound Innovation and outbound innovation (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009; Dahlander 
& Gann, 2010). Inbound open innovation refers to internal use of external knowledge, whereas 
outbound open innovation refers to external exploitation of internal knowledge. This relates to the 
processes of knowledge exploration, retention, and exploitation that can be performed either inside 
or outside a firm (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009). 
 
When it comes to inbound innovation formal intellectual property rights (IPR) reduces transaction 
costs, hence firms often require that knowledge suppliers have formal IPR in place before they 
collaborate (Dahlander & Gann, 2010). Those firms that require strong IPR to protect their 
knowledge remain reluctant to engage in external innovation (Gooroochurn & Hanley, 2007). For 
outbound Innovation: firms that rely on trade secrets, formal agreements such as patents, copyright 
and trademarks, and lead time to protect their innovation are less likely to engage in external 
innovation and so they prefer to retain innovation in-house. 
 
The size of a firm and its related resources is also a mediating variable here. For example, larger 
firms with greater co-specialized resources will be more successful in adopting inbound innovation 
(Licthentaler, 2008; Sandulli & Chesbrough, 2009). Whereas, smaller companies typically lack the 
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capabilities to structure the process of searching and selecting external innovation, especially 
regarding decisions whether to file patents or disclose or anticipating the potential value of inbound 
innovation (Dahlander & Gann, 2010). Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are more 
affected by the uncertainty of innovation projects because the failure of a project could compromise 
the future of the entire firm; thus, they prefer to share this uncertainty by adopting outbound 
innovation (Van de Vrande et al., 2009). 
 
Another, unexpected, problem with Open Innovation are the recent findings of Hacievliyagil (2007; 
also Hacievliyagil, Auger & Hartmann 2008) that, even though a company has opened up (the flow 
of knowledge) towards other companies, the internal boundaries of the company have tightened, 
decreasing and limiting the free flow of knowledge between different departments within the 
company. This apparent contradiction was observed within Philips and DSM, and may be a 
common side effect of the current implementation of Open Innovation. To verify this hypothesis, 
further studies are necessary of companies which adhere to the principles of Open Innovation and 
have (re)structured the organization accordingly. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
In this chapter we have argued support for not only the need for research to build on previous work, 
but also that those of us working within the field recognize the past contributions of others. The 
need for critical analysis within research is self-evident amongst academics. Those of us in the field 
would be correctly criticized if we did not hold up new concepts, theories and assertions and 
scrutinize them thoroughly. This is a slightly updated version of our 2009 paper (Trott & Hartmann, 
2009) in which we first presented a critical review of Open Innovation. At that time, the new 
concept op Open Innovation had been widely praised and adopted but no critical analysis existed of 
the origin of the ideas it contained and the reality of the dichotomy it pretended to solve. We feel 
that the Open Innovation community has given insufficient credit to previous researchers who 
described, analyzed and argued in favor of most of the principles on which Open Innovation was 
founded, long before the term for this new model was actually coined. In fact, the Open Innovation 
concept would gain credibility when scientific evidence for the correctness of the basic principles of 
the model in the existing literature is recognized appropriately. 
 
If Open Innovation is in essence nothing new, why then has this concept been so readily embraced 
by firms and the R&D community? Much of this surely is due to its simplicity (it is appealing 
because it is simple and retains the linear notion of science to marketplace) and the partial deception 
which was created by describing something which is undoubtedly true in itself (the limitations of 
closed innovation principles), but false in conveying the wrong impression that firms today still 
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follow these principles. The open versus closed systems of innovation are presented as two 
alternatives faced by firms. This lends credence to the larger argument by giving the impression that 
the options are mutually exclusive, even though this is not the case. It is precisely the simplicity and 
the certainty of this logic that has enabled the design of a dichotomy. If something is not true, surely 
it must be false; if something is not false, surely it must be true. Stated another way: if something is 
wrong, then surely the opposite must be right. This sharp polarisation allows no middle ground. Yet 
something may be partly true and partly false.  
 
Unmistakably, Chesbrough has been very successful in popularising the notion of technology 
transfer and the need to share and exchange knowledge. Indeed, it seems that in using a business 
strategy perspective the Open Innovation concept may have reached new audiences (e.g., CEOs of 
technology-intensive companies) that for so many years the innovation and R&D literatures failed 
to reach. The fact that large multinational companies such as Procter & Gamble and Philips have 
incorporated the principles of Open Innovation and facilitate conferences and publications on the 
subject deserves admiration and praise. In essence, it has created real-life laboratories (playgrounds) 
in which the mechanisms of Open Innovation can be studied in great detail (see, for example, 
Hacievliyagil, 2007 and Hacievliyagil, Auger & Hartmann, 2008). We hope that, in the true realm 
of scientific experimentation, objective assessment of the results will lead to improvements in the 
theory of Open Innovation. What gives us cause for concern is that the CEOs that now seem to be 
showing interest in innovation management may become frustrated and disillusioned when it 
becomes clear that „open innovation‟ is not a panacea. The best way to avoid this from happening is 
to consider Open Innovation as a work in progress. In the true spirit of openness, additions and 
modifications to the Open Innovation model must be welcomed. It is therefore imperative that this 
work in progress is scrutinized against its own prescribing principles. To paraphrase just one 
principle of Open Innovation (not all the smart people in our field work for us): not all good ideas in 
innovation originate from Harvard Business School and the Haas School of Business.  
 
In the four years since the publication of our original paper (Trott & Hartmann, 2009), we were 
pleased to see that it is one of the most cited papers published in the International Journal of 
Innovation Management. Despite all this attention and about three dozen papers that acknowledge 
(and in many cases agree with) our critical view on Open Innovation, „the father of open 
innovation‟ (as he is referred to in Chesbrough, 2012), Henry Chesbrough, has carried on regardless 
despite the ten papers he has published since 2010.  
 
 
References 
 
Page 21 
 
ABCM (1919) Report of the British Chemical Mission on Chemical Factories in the Occupied Area 
of Germany.) 
Adler, P.S., McDonald, D.W. & MacDonald, F. (1992) „Strategic management of technical 
functions‟, Sloan Management Review, Winter, 19–37. 
Alexander, M. & Korine, H. (2008) When You Shouldn‟t Go Global, Harvard Business Review, 
Vol. 86, (12), 70 - 77, December. 
Allen, T.J. (1977) Managing the flow of technology; Cambridge Mass. MIT Press. 
Allen, T.J. & Cohen, W.M. (1969) „Information flow in research and development laboratories‟, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1, 12–19. 
Auster, E.R. (1987) „International corporate linkages: dynamic forms in changing environments‟, 
Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. 22, No. 2, 3–6. 
Berkhout, A.J., Patrick van der Duin, Dap Hartmann & Roland Ortt, (2007), The Cyclic Nature of 
Innovation: Connecting Hard Sciences with Soft Values. Advances in the Study of 
Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Economic Growth, Vol.17, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Bleeke, J. & Ernst, D. (1992) Collaborating to Compete, John Wiley, New York. 
Bromley, D. A. (2004) Technology policy. Technology in Society, 26(2-3): 455-468. 
Brown, J. S. & Hagel III, J. (2006) Creation nets: Getting the most from open innovation. 
McKinsey Quarterly(2): 40-51. 
Budden, R. (2003) „Sony-Ericsson seeks success with new phones‟, www.FT.com, 3 March. 
Carter, C.F. & Williams, B.R. (1959) „The characteristics of technically progressive firms‟. Journal 
of Industrial Economics, March, 87–104. 
Chan, P.S. & Heide, D. (1993) „Strategic alliances in technology: key competitive weapon‟, 
Advanced Management Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4, 9–18. 
Chesbrough, H. (2003a) Open Innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting from 
technology, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Chesbrough, H. (2003b) The era of open innovation. MIT Sloan Management Review, 44(3): 35-
41. 
Chesbrough, H. (2003c) The logic of open innovation: Managing intellectual property. California 
Management Review, 45(3): 33-58. 
Chesbrough, H. (2004) Managing open innovation. Research-Technology Management, 47(1): 23-
26. 
Chesbrough, H. (2006). Open innovation: A new paradigm for understanding industrial innovation. 
In H.W. Chesbrough, W. Vanhaverbeke & J. West (eds.), Open Innovation: Researching a 
New Paradigm, pp. 1–12. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chesbrough, HW (2007). Why companies should have open business models. MIT Sloan 
Management Review, 48(2), 1–22. 
Chesbrough, H. (2012), Open innovation: Where we've been and where we're going, Research 
Technology Management 55 (4) , pp. 20-27 
Chesbrough, H. & Schwartz, K. (2007) Innovating business models with codevelopment 
partnerships. Research-Technology Management, 50(1): 55-59. 
Chesnais, F. (1988) „Multinational enterprises and the international diffusion of technology‟, in 
Dosi, G., Freeman, C., Nelson, R., Silverberg, G., & Soete, L. (eds) Technical Change and 
Economic Theory, Pinter, London, pp. 496–572. 
Chiaromonte, F. (2006) Open innovation through alliances and partnership: theory and practice. 
International Journal of Technology Management, 33(2-3): 111-114. 
Christensen, C.M. (1997) The innovator‟s dilemma: When new technologies cause great firms to 
fail, Cambridge, Mass., HBS Press. 
Christensen, J.F., Olesen, M.H., & Kjaer, J.S. (2005) The industrial dynamics of Open Innovation - 
Evidence from the transformation of consumer electronics. Research Policy, 34(10): 1533-
1549. 
Cohen, W.M. & Levinthal, D.A. (1990) A new perspective on learning and innovation; 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), pp.128-152. 
Page 22 
Cohen, W. & Levinthal, D., (1989) “Innovation and Learning: the two faces of R&D,” The 
Economic Journal, 99, 569-596. 
Conway, S. & Stewart, F. (1998) „Mapping innovation networks‟, International Journal of 
Innovation Management, Vol. 2, No. 2, 223–54. 
Cooke, P. (2005) Regionally asymmetric knowledge capabilities and open innovation exploring 
'Globalisation 2' - A new model of industry organisation. Research Policy, 34(8): 1128-1149. 
Cooper, R.G. (1999) The invisible success factors in product innovation,” Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, 16, 2, April 1999, 115-133; R.G. Cooper, “New product leadership: 
building in the success factors,” New Product Development & Innovation Management, 1,2, 
125-140. 
Dahlander, L. & Wallin, M.W. (2006) A man on the inside: Unlocking communities as 
complementary assets. Research Policy, 35(8): 1243-1259. 
Dahlander, L. & Gann, D.M. (2010) How open is innovation? Research Policy, 39, (6), 699-709. 
Dittrich, K. & Duysters, G. (2007) Networking as a Means to Strategy Change: The Case of Open 
Innovation in Mobile Telephony, Journal of Product Innovation Management, 24(5): 510-521. 
Dodgson, M., Gann D. & Salter, A. (2006) The role of technology in the shift towards open 
innovation: the case of Procter & Gamble, R&D Management, 36(3), 333-346. 
Enkel, E., Gassmann, O. & Chesbrough, H.(2009) Exploring the phenomenon. R&D Management 
Journal, 39(4), 311–316. 
Enkel, E. & Lenz, A. (2009). Open innovation metrics system. Proceedings of the R&D 
Management Conference, Vienna, Austria, June 21–24. 
Enkel, E., Kausch, C., & Gassmann, O. (2005) Managing the risk of customer integration. European 
Management Journal, 23(2): 203-213. 
Faulkner, D. (1995) Co-operating to Compete, McGraw-Hill International, Maidenhead. 
Fetterhoff, T. J. & Voelkel, D. (2006) Managing open innovation in biotechnology. Research-
Technology Management, 49(3): 14-18. 
Fleming, L. & Waguespack, D.M. (2007) Brokerage, Boundary Spanning, and Leadership in Open 
Innovation Communities, Organization Science, 18(2)165-184. 
FredBerg, T., Elmquist, M. & Ollila. S. (2008) Managing Open Innovation -Present Findings and 
Future Directions. VINNOVA Report VR, March:02, ISSN: 1650-3104. 
Freeman, C. (1982) The Economics of Industrial Innovation, 2nd edn, Frances Pinter, London. 
Freeman, C. (1991) Networks of innovators: A synthesis of research issues. Research Policy, 20(5), 
499-514.  
Gassmann, O. & Reepmeyer, G. (2005) Organizing Pharmaceutical Innovation: From Science-
based Knowledge Creators to Drug-oriented Knowledge Brokers. Creativity and Innovation 
Management, 14(3): 233-245. 
Gassmann, O., Sandmeier, P., & Wecht, C. H. (2006) Extreme customer innovation in the front-
end: learning from a new software paradigm. International Journal of Technology 
Management, 33(1): 46-66. 
Gaule, A. (2006) Open Innovation in Action: How to be strategic in the search for new sources of 
value. London: Blackwell. 
Gooroochurn, N. & Hanley, A., ( 2007) A Tale of Two Literatures: Transaction Cost and Property 
Rights in Innovation Outsourcing, Research Policy, 36, 1483-1495. 
Granstrand, O., Bohlin, E., Oskarsson, C. & Sjoberg, N. (1992) „External technology acquisition in 
large multi-technology corporations‟, R&D Management, Vol. 22, No. 2, 111–33. 
Gulati, R. (1995) „Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual 
choice in alliances‟, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1, 85–112. 
Hacıevliyagil, N.K., Auger, F. & Hartmann, D. (2008) in preparation. 
Hacıevliyagil, N.K. (2007) The Impact of Open Innovation on Technology Transfers at Philips and 
DSM, M.Sc. Thesis Faculty of Technology, Policy & Management, Delft University of 
Technology. 
Hagedoorn, J. (1990) „Organisational modes of inter-firm co-operation and technology transfer‟, 
Technovation, Vol. 10, No. 1, 17–30. 
Page 23 
Harney, A., 2001, „Ambitious expansion loses its shine: analysts change their tune about Sony‟s 
dreams and begin to count the costs of the new mobile phone alliance with Ericsson‟, 
Financial Times, 2 October. 
Harryson, S. J. (2008) Entrepreneurship through relationships – navigating from creativity to 
commercialisation, R&D Management, vol 38, 3, 291-310. 
Henkel, J. (2006) Selective revealing in open innovation processes: The case of embedded Linux. 
Research Policy, 35(7): 953-969. 
Hobday, M., Rush, H., Bessant, J. (2004) Approaching the innovation frontier in Korea: the 
transition phase to leadership. Research Policy, Dec 2004, vol 33, No 10, 1433-1457. 
Hoecht, A. & Trott, P. (1999), Trust, risk and control in the management of collaborative 
technology development, International Journal of Innovation Management, vol.3,no1, pp.257-
270. 
Huizingh, E.K.R.E (2011) Open innovation: State of the art and future perspectives. Technovation, 
31 (1), 1-68. 
Huston, L. & Sakkab, N. (2007) Implementing open innovation. Research-Technology 
Management, 50(2): 21-25. 
Inkpen, A.C. & Dinar, A. (1998), “Knowledge management processes and international joint 
ventures”, Organization Science, Vol. 9 No. 4, pp. 454-68. 
Jacobides, M.G. & Billinger, S. (2006) Designing the boundaries of the firm: From ”make, buy, or 
ally” to the dynamic benefits of vertical architecture. Organization Science, 17(2): 249-261. 
Kaufman, A., Wood, C.H. & Theyel, G. (2000) „Collaboration and technology linkages: a strategic 
supplier typology‟, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21, 649–63. 
Lawson, B. & Samson, D. (2001) Developing Innovation Capability In Organisations: A 
DynamicCapabilities Approach, International Journal Of Innovation Management, 5 (3), 377-
400 
Lefever, D.B. (1992) „Technology transfer and the role of intermediaries‟, PhD thesis, INTA, 
Cranfield Institute of Technology. 
Lewis, J.D. (1990) Partnerships for Profit, The Free Press, New York. 
Lichtenthaler, U. & Ernst, H. (2006) Attitudes to externally organizing knowledge management 
tasks: a review, reconsideration and extension of the NIH syndrome. R & D Management, 
36(4): 367-386. 
Lichtenthaler, U. (2007a) The drivers of technology licensing: An industry comparison. California 
Management Review, 49(4): 67-+. 
Lichtenthaler, U. (2007b) Hierarchical strategies and strategic fit in the keepor-sell decision. 
Management Decision, 45(3): 340-359. 
Lichtenthaler, U. & Ernst, H. (2008) Intermediary services in the markets for technology: 
Organizational antecedents and performance consequences. Organizational Studies, 29, 1003–
38. 
Lincoln, J.R., Ahmadjan, C.L. & Mason, E. (1998), “Organizational learning and purchase supply 
relationships in Japan: Hitachoi, Matsushita and Toyota compared”, California Management 
Review, Vol. 40 No. 3, pp. 241-64. 
Littler, D.A. (2001) „Roles and rewards of collaboration‟, in Tidd J., Bessant J. & Pault K., 
Managing Innovation: Integrating Technological, Market and Organisational Charge, 2nd 
edn, Wiley, Chichester. 
Maidique, M. & Patch, P. (1988) „Corporate strategy and technology policy‟, in Tushman, L. & 
Moore, W.L. (eds) Readings in the Management of Innovation, HarperCollins, New York. 
Mowery, D. (1983) The relationships between intrafirm and contractual forms of industrial research 
in American manufacturing. Explorations in Economic History, 20. 
Nonaka, I. & Kenney, M. (1991) Towards a new theory of innovation management: A case study 
comparing Canon, Inc. and Apple Computer, Inc. Jrnl of Engineering and Technology 
Management, 8, 67-83. 
Nonaka, I (1991). The knowledge creating company. Harvard Business Review, 69, Nov-Dec, 96-
104.  
Page 24 
Norman, P. (2004), “Knowledge acquisition, knowledge loss and satisfaction in high technology 
alliances”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 57 No. 6, pp. 610-9. 
Oxley, J. & Sampson, R. (2004) The scope and governance of knowledge sharing alliances,  
Patel, P. & Pavitt, K. (2000) „How technological competencies help define the core (not the 
boundaries) of the firm‟, in Dosi, G., Nelson, R. & Winter, S.G. (eds), The Nature and 
Dynamics of Organisational Capabilities, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 313–33. 
Pearson, A.W. & Ball, D.F., 1993. A framework for managing communication at the 
R&D/Marketing interface. Technovation 13 7, pp. 439–447. 
Pearson, A.W., Green, Timothy & Ball, D.F. (1979), „A Model for Studying Organizational Effects 
of an Increase in the Size of R&D Projects‟, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 
Vol. EM- 26, No.1, February 1979, pp.14-21. 
Piller, F.T. & Walcher, D. (2006) Toolkits for idea competitions: a novel method to integrate users 
in new product development. R & D Management, 36(3): 307-318. 
Rothwell, R. & Zegweld, W. (1985) Reindustrialisation and Technology, London: Longman. 
Rothwell, R. (1992) Successful industrial innovation: critical factors for the 1990's. R & D 
Management 22 (3), 64-84. 
Rothwell, R., Freeman, C., Horlsey, A., Jervis, V.T.P., Robertson, A.B. & Townsend, J. (1974) 
„SAPPHO updated: Project SAPPHO phase II‟, Research Policy, 3, 258–91. 
Sandulli, F. & Chesbrough, H. (2009), The two faces of open business models. Working Paper. 
Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325682.  
Simard, C. & West, J. (2006) Knowledge Networks and the Geographic Locus of Innovation, in H. 
W. Chesbrough & W. Vanhaverbeke & J. West (Eds.), Open innovation: Researching a new 
paradigm: 220-240. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tao, J. & Magnotta, V. (2006) How air products and chemicals ”identifies and accelerates”. 
Research Technology Management, 49(5): 12-18. 
Teece, D.J. (1986). “Profiting from technological innovation”. Research Policy, 15(6), 285–305. 
Tidd, J. (1993) Development of Novel Products through intraorganizational and interorganizational 
networks, Journal of Product Innovation Management, 12, 307-322. 
Tilton, J.E. (1971) International Diffusion of Technology: The case of semiconductors. Washington, 
DC.: The Brookings Institute. 
Trott, P. (2008) Managing Innovation & New product Development, 4
th
 ed., Prentice Hall, London. 
Trott, P., Cordey-Hayes, M. & Seaton, R.A.F. (1995) Inward Technology Transfer as an Interactive 
process: A case study of ICI, Technovation, 15(1), pp. 25-43. 
Trott P., Hartmann, D. (2009) Why 'Open Innovation' Is Old Wine in New Bottles, International 
Journal of Innovation Management, 13 (4), 715-736 
Tushman, M.L. (1978) Task characteristics and technical communication in research and 
development. Academy of Management Review Jrnl., 20 (2), 75-86. 
Tushman, M.L., (1977), „Technical communication in R&D laboratories: The impact of project 
work characteristics‟, Academy of Management Journal 20, pp.624–645. 
Van de Vrande, V., de Jong, J.P.J., Vanhaverbeke, W., & De Rochemont, M., 2009. Open 
innovation in SME‟s: trends, motives andmanagementchallenges. Technovation 29, 423–437. 
Van der Meer, H. (2007) Open Innovation – The Dutch Treat: Challenges in Thinking in Business 
Models. Creativity and Innovation Management, 16(2): 192-202. 
Vanhaverbeke, W. (2006) The inter-organizational context of open innovation, in Chesbrough, 
Vanhaverbeke & West (Eds.) Open innovation: Researching a new paradigm, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 205-219. 
Vyas, N.M., Shelburn, W.L. & Rogers, D.C. (1995) „An analysis of strategic alliances: forms, 
functions and framework‟, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, Summer, Vol. 10, 
No. 3, 47. 
West, J. & Gallagher, S. (2006) Challenges of open innovation: the paradox of firm investment in 
open-source software. R & D Management, 36(3): 319-331. 
Page 25 
West, J., Vanhaverbeke, W., & Chesbrough, H. W. (2006) Open innovation: A research agenda. In 
H. W. Chesbrough & W. Vanhaverbeke & J. West (Eds.), Open innovation: Researching a 
new paradigm: 285-307. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Witzeman, S., Slowinski, G., Dirkx, R., Gollob, L., Tao, J., Ward, S., & Miraglia, S. (2006) 
Harnessing external technology for innovation. Research-Technology Management, 49(3): 
19-27. 
